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Abstract 
 
We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability 
insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral 
hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its 
risk-spreading gains will likely be larger than its adverse effects on precautionary activities. We 
discuss the numerous features of liability insurance contracts that are designed to reduce ex ante 
moral hazard, and examine the evidence of their effects. Most studies conclude that these 
features work reasonably well, so that liability insurance probably does not generate substantial 
ex ante moral hazard.  Its effects on ex post moral hazard (the increased tendency of victims to 
sue in the presence of insurance) are not as clear, however, and the welfare consequences of 
increased litigation are ambiguous, for reasons we explain. We discuss additional issues such as 
the effects of liability insurance when some defendants are judgment-proof, the problems posed 
by non-independence of liability risks owing to changes in legal doctrines, and the cyclical 
nature of liability insurance markets. 
  
 
 3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Tort cases are typically denominated in terms of a victim suing an injurer.  But injurers 
do not typically pay the damages (if any) for which they are held liable.  As a result, empirical 
legal researchers conventionally use liability insurance premiums as a reasonably good proxy for 
those damages.  (Baker forthcoming)  The presence of insurance shapes who is sued, and for 
what; it shapes litigation strategy and settlement negotiations; and in some cases it even affects 
the underlying liability itself.  (Baker 2006). Indeed, we suggest that it is not going too far to 
claim, echoing the great biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky, that little or nothing in Tort law 
makes sense except in the light of liability insurance.1  In similar fashion, Kenneth Abraham 
describes the relationship between tort law and liability insurance using the metaphor of a bipolar 
star: separate bodies that form a common gravitational field.  (Abraham 2008). 
 Tort’s deterrence function requires that injurers internalize the costs of their behavior by 
paying for the injuries they cause. But liability insurance would seem to sever the link between 
injurers’ behavior and its financial consequences, since the party that caused the injury no longer 
ends up paying for it. The key insight in the theoretical economics of liability insurance is that 
such insurance is surprisingly likely to be compatible with robust deterrence, because insurers 
have various ways of coping with the moral hazard2 problem created by de-linking injurers’ 
                                                 
1  Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution, 35 AMER. BIO. TEACHER 125 (1973). 
 2  Loosely speaking, moral hazard is the tendency of insurance to diminish an insured’s incentives to take 
care that would reduce the risk being insured against.  It arises because of a classic externality: the costs of taking 
care fall on the insured, but the benefits of care accrue to the party who will pay for any losses, namely the insurer. 
For example, suppose an injurer is fully insured against liability for any accident he causes. He could eliminate any 
risk of a $100 accident by spending $2 on care, but without the care, the accident risk is 50 percent. If uninsured, the 
injurer would obviously prefer to spend $2 on care and save himself $50 (= 1/2×100) in expected liability. But with 
full insurance, the $2 eliminates a risk that the insured would not be responsible for, since liability is borne by his 
insurer.  Now, the $2 is a complete waste from the insured’s perspective, even though it is in society’s interest to 
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financial responsibilities for injury from the costs of injury-reduction. As we explain in detail 
below, insurance contracts contain numerous structural features designed to limit moral hazard, 
and the consensus is that these features seem to work reasonably well. (On the other hand, 
although empirical evidence is scanty, there do appear to be some types of moral hazard that are 
not so well-controlled.) 
 Tort law is also centrally concerned with problems of compensation for victims. In this 
context, first-party insurance may work as an alternative to tort; society need worry less about 
making injurers pay victims if the latter can collect from their own insurers instead.  The 
significance of these other compensation systems to tort law can be seen in the attention paid to 
them by the global reinsurance companies that reinsure liability risks.  (Lahnstein 2011)   
Countries with more first party insurance, especially social insurance, have less need for tort law 
compensation.  The relationship between workers compensation and tort law is similar.  For 
example, one explanation for the size of asbestos liability losses in the U.S. as compared to other 
highly industrialized countries is the willingness of workers compensation and other social 
insurance arrangements to compensate asbestos bodily injury losses in countries such as France 
and Japan.  (Lahnstein 2011). 
 
2. History 
 
Although now widely accepted in the U.S., insurance against tort (and tort-like) liability 
was controversial when introduced in the US in the late 19th century (McNeely (1941), Abraham  
2008; Pandya 2011).  The experience in Europe was similar: some opposition in the early years, 
                                                                                                                                                             
have him make this investment.  Note that moral hazard can only occur if the insured’s level of care is unobservable 
to the insurer: if that were not the case, the insurer could simply specify the required level of care as part of the 
insurance contract, and then refuse to pay if the insured tried to slack-off by taking less than the specified level of 
care.  
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followed by acceptance and then encouragement of liability insurance in order to promote the 
financial responsibility of tortfeasors (Tunc 1983 at 50-5). Under Soviet law liability insurance 
was prohibited until recent years (Id.).  The key issue, then as now, was moral hazard (Baker, 
1996): many believed that allowing insurance for tort liability would lead potential tortfeasors to 
be less careful to prevent injuries, since they could shift the cost of any liability to their insurer.  
There was often a moral or policy objection as well, founded on the belief that tort 
sanctions were meant to punish wrongdoers, a purpose that would be frustrated if injurers could 
avoid having to pay for the harms they caused. The early debates were undertaken without 
benefit of any real empirical evidence or theoretical framework, however, and what may 
ultimately have carried the day in favor of liability insurance was the absence of any organized 
interest with a stake in opposing it (Pandya 2011). Echoes of these earlier controversies can be 
heard today in more-modest debates over insurance coverage for punitive damages (Sharkey 
2005), for liability arising under various employment laws (Employment Practices Liability 
Insurance or EPLI; e.g., Gabel, et al (2006), Mootz (1997), Gallagher (1994)), and for tort 
liabilities that are also crimes (Baker 2009).  (See also Baker & Griffith 2010 on early objections 
to directors’ and officers’ liability insurance.) The reach of liability insurance has largely 
expanded to include these areas.  
3. Justifications for the Purchase of Liability Insurance 
A. Individuals 
In the standard model, individuals and large corporations purchase insurance against tort 
liability for different reasons.  Individuals are risk averse, meaning that they have a declining 
marginal utility of money.  Insurance against liability risks, like other kinds of insurance, allows 
individuals to shift money from no-loss, low-marginal-utility states of the world into loss, high-
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marginal-utility states of the world. When losses are shifted from the risk averse to the risk 
neutral (or when they are transformed from being undiversified to diversified) utility (welfare) 
goes up.   The interested reader can refer to the Appendix for a summary of the standard analysis 
of the demand for and welfare effects of insurance. 
Because of the law of large numbers, insurance is superior to precautionary savings for 
this purpose, as long as the liability risks of individuals in the pool are not too strongly 
correlated.  In addition, individuals are sometimes required to purchase liability insurance (e.g., 
auto), or find it bundled with other insurance they are required to buy (e.g., homeowners 
insurance, which is required by lenders and which covers some liability risks). 
B. Corporations 
Publicly-traded corporations are understood to be owned for investment purposes by 
individuals with diversified portfolios and, thus, do not need insurance for risk distribution 
purposes. One intuition is that a fully diversified individual would own shares in both the 
tortfeasor and the supplier of liability insurance.  Indeed, because of the downside protection 
from limited liability, diversified investors may actually want corporations to be risk-preferring.  
Yet the available evidence suggests that corporations widely purchase insurance.  (Baker & 
Griffith 2010). 
Several explanations—with varying welfare consequences—have been offered for why 
publicly-held corporations might nevertheless want to purchase liability insurance. One source of 
insurance demand is agency costs.  Managers may be risk averse if they earn rents as a result of 
their investment firm-specific human capital, which ties their earnings to the profits of their 
employer (Arlen 1992: 419-20). Although shareholders can fully diversify with respect to losses 
of the firm, its managers can not: if the share price plummets or the firm goes bankrupt, its 
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managers stand to lose their rents. Indeed, managers’ contractual compensation ostensibly 
requires them to bear some risks in order to motivate them to avoid shirking. This then gives 
them an incentive to purchase insurance that reduces the variability of corporate profits, and 
hence of their own remuneration, even though this is not in the interests of shareholders. (Baker 
& Griffith 2010 provide qualitative evidence in support of this explanation).   
 More benign explanations for corporate liability insurance have also been offered, however. 
Mayers and Smith identify institutional reasons that would lead even a publicly traded 
corporation to benefit from shifting money from no-loss to loss states of the world and, thus, to 
act as if it faced a declining marginal utility of money: increasing marginal income tax rates, 
bankruptcy costs, and what they called the “underinvestment” problem (which relates to different 
incentives for equity and debt investors in certain situations) (Mayers & Smith 1982, 1987; 
MacMinn & Garven 2000).  Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) suggest that the higher costs of 
external capital (as compared to internal capital) constitute an additional institutional justification 
for corporate insurance and other forms of hedging.  In addition, corporations may purchase 
insurance because it is bundled with other services that they value, such as loss prevention and 
claims management (Mayers & Smith 1982; Skogh 1989). Having the same firm sell loss control 
advice and insurance makes loss-control recommendations more credible, because the entity 
making the recommendation is also responsible for paying any losses that might occur. Insurance 
companies can thus more fully “bond” their loss prevention and claims management services 
than can separate loss-control service providers  (Cohen 1997).  Of course, corporations might 
also demand insurance because their regulators require it, or because their counterparties do 
(Goldberg, 2009).  
Finally, privately held corporations and non-profit corporations have all of these same 
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reasons to purchase insurance (except that non-profits are not taxed and, to the extent that 
privately held corporations do not separate ownership from control, they may not face the same 
agency costs).  In addition, privately held corporations would seem more likely to have non-
diversified owners, and nonprofits, by definition, are not owned for investment purposes and, 
thus, are unlikely to be risk neutral (Arlen, 1992: 419).  
3. The Classic Model of Liability and Insurance 
The canonical formal analysis of the moral hazard effects of liability insurance is due to 
Shavell (1982, and for a less-formal treatment, 2004); Calabresi (1970) earlier offered significant 
insights. Shavell begins with the fact that insurance is socially valuable to the extent that parties 
are risk-averse, because bearing risk is costly. On the other hand, liability insurance may reduce 
social welfare to the extent that insurance enables risk-imposers to avoid bearing the expected 
costs of their risky activities: this is the familiar tension between the risk-spreading benefits of 
insurance and its potential risk-creating consequences (via moral hazard). Shavell’s (1982, 2004) 
contribution is to show that this tradeoff is significantly more complicated than had been 
previously realized, and under certain conditions, may not exist at all; even if it does, the 
presence of liability insurance can still be shown to be welfare-improving relative to no 
insurance, at least in many instances of the canonical tort model. 
A.  The Canonical Model without Insurance (Risk-Neutrality) 
Shavell (1982) situates insurance in the canonical model of negligence and strict liability 
(Brown, 1973; Shavell, 1980).3 To set up our later analysis of liability in the presence of 
                                                 
  3  This classic economic model of accidents is discussed in Jennifer Arlen, “Economic Analysis of Liability 
for Accidents.” in this volume.   The application of this model to accidents involving customers is discussed in 
Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum, Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory and in  Jennifer 
Arlen, Economic Analysis of Medical Malpractice Liability: Theory Grounded in Evidence, also in this volume. 
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insurance, we briefly review that model here, under the standard initial assumption that both 
injurers and victims are risk-neutral, and thus do not demand insurance. Both injurers and 
victims are assumed to be able to take care to prevent an accident from occurring, so we are in a 
two-party accident world. Care is costly to the party taking it, and thus, absent liability, injurers 
will not take care, since doing so reduces the probability of an accident for which they do not 
have to pay, and thus only benefits victims. Without insurance, victims will take the optimal 
amount of care, however, because they bear both the cost of care and the expected benefits 
(reduction in harm to themselves).  
Introducing strict liability (and assuming that litigation is costless and that damages are 
set equal to the actual harm suffered by victims) reverses these results. (Of course, if the rule is 
strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, then victims will have some incentive to 
take care.)  Now, injurers will have the appropriate incentives to take care, because they bear the 
costs of any precautions taken, but also reap the benefits of care, in the form of lower expected 
liability to victims. On the other hand, victims are essentially fully insured because if an accident 
occurs, the injurer will be strictly liable for any harm that results. That leaves victims with no 
reason to take care, since it is costly to do so, and the benefits (a lower likelihood of an accident) 
accrue solely to (strictly-liable) injurers. 
A key insight of the Shavell model is that injurers have more than one way of reducing 
accident risks: they can incur costs of precaution—“care” (such as driving more slowly) — and 
they can undertake an activity less often (e.g., by driving less-frequently). Under a strict liability 
regime, injurers will be led to consider all possible ways of reducing accident risks, because 
injurers will always be liable for any harms that materialize. If it is cost-effective to reduce 
liability by driving less-often (in addition to more-carefully), a strict liability regime will give 
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injurers reason to do so. In short, strict liability leads injurers to optimize on both the activity 
level (frequency) margin and the care/precaution margin in managing liability risk (Shavell, 
1980). 
A negligence regime works somewhat differently. The law defines a standard of care, 
compliance with which guarantees that an injurer is not negligent, and therefore not liable for 
any accident that may occur. An injurer taking less than the standard of care is negligent and thus 
liable for any accidents that result, as well as paying the costs of whatever care, if any, it has 
taken. Injurers will never take more than the standard of care, because doing so only reduces the 
probability of an accident that would not be the injurer’s fault to begin with, and hence provides 
benefit only to the victim. Injurers will not take less than the standard of care, either, because on 
standard assumptions, they will find it cheaper to comply with the standard, since doing so 
eliminates all expected liability, and leaves them with only the costs of care itself.4  Moreover, 
this model assumes that injurers can always comply because they always know when they are 
negligent and have full control over whether they take care.  Thus, the model predicts that 
injurers will never be negligent as long as courts set due care equal to optimal care (Shavell, 
1980), damages are set at optimal levels (Cooter, 1984; Arlen, 1985), and courts do not err in 
determining whether injurers and victims are negligent.5  Accordingly, in a perfect world, for 
                                                 
  4  This result depends on the additional assumption that injurers can always comply because they always 
know when they are negligent and have full control over whether they take care.  For a discussion of optimal 
accident law when injurers are organizations, and thus have less than perfect control of their actions see Reinier 
Kraakman, “Economic Analysis of Vicarious Liability,” in this volume.  For an analysis of optimal accidental law 
when injurers may err accidentally see Jennifer Arlen, “Economic Analysis of Liability for Accidents” in this 
volume. 
  5 More refined versions of the model do predict injurer negligence under some circumstances. For example, 
if the standard of care is set very high, injurers may find it cheaper to take the cost-minimizing level of care—even 
though that is below the standard—and pay for those accidents that result. Injurers may also be negligent because of 
errors they make in estimating the standard of care (Arlen & MacLeod, 2005), or mistakes by courts in applying the 
standard to injurer behavior, among many other reasons  (Cooter, 1984; Calfee & Craswell, XXX). 
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compensation purpose, negligence liability in effect translates into a rule of no liability to the 
victim, since if an accident occurs, it will never be paid for by the injurer (who is never at fault). 
Victims will thus take the appropriate amount of care for the same reason they do under a regime 
of no-liability (for injurers): in fact, victims operate under just such a regime when injurers are 
non-negligent. 
Significantly, negligence differs from strict liability in its ability to control injurers’ 
activity levels. Consider driving as an example.  An injurer who always drives non-negligently 
(takes the standard of care) will by definition never be liable under a negligence regime.  Hence, 
such an injurer has no liability-based reason to curtail the amount of her driving, because doing 
so is costly and reaps her no benefits in terms of lower liability.  By contrast, victims do have an 
incentive to control activity levels under a pure negligence regime.  That’s because victims will 
always bear the cost of any injuries that occur (since injurers are non-negligent). Thus, victims 
will want to consider all options (crossing the street more carefully, or crossing less often) to 
reduce the risk of injury (Shavell, 1980).  
B. The Canonical Model with Insurance 
Table 1 summarizes the main analysis of Shavell (1982) when we assume that both 
injurers and victims are risk-averse, rather than risk-neutral, and hence have a demand for full 
insurance that is fairly priced.6 The introduction of risk-aversion makes the social decision 
problem more complicated. As before, we want to provide both injurers and victims with 
incentives to take the optimal amount of care, and to engage optimally in risky activities. In 
                                                 
  6  As discussed above, corporations may demand insurance for many reasons other than risk aversion.  The 
benign conclusions of the Shavell analysis would presumably change if the corporate demand for insurance derives 
from, for example, managerial exploitation of agency costs—at shareholders’ expense—rather than risk aversion. 
We know of no systematic theoretical inquiry into this issue, however. 
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addition, however, we want to spread or allocate risks optimally between parties. Bearing risk is 
costly for a risk-averse party, and these costs need to be factored into the social decision rule in 
addition to the costs of accidents themselves and the costs of accident prevention.7 
Table 1 about here 
1. Strict liability 
Consider first a rule of strict liability, as shown in Column 1 of Table 1.8  Under this 
regime, victims are already in effect fully insured by injurers (who are obliged to pay for 
whatever accidents occur), and hence have no demand for insurance. In the extreme case, victims 
bear no risk and take no precautions, so the presence of insurance does not alter their behavior at 
all.  
On the injurer’s side, strict liability causes injurers to bear the full expected cost of 
accidents.  Risk averse injurers thus will want to insure against liability risk.  Initially, it might 
seem that this insurance would fully undermine the incentive effects of the tort system because 
fully insured injurers have no incentive to invest in avoiding accidents.  Yet this generally is not 
the case for two reasons. 
First, insured injurers will retain an incentive to invest in care if liability insurers can 
observe their care and activity levels and price insurance accordingly.  In addition, injurers will 
retain strong incentives to invest in care if liability insurance is “experience-rated,” in that 
                                                 
7  The analysis here focuses exclusively on injuries that involve replaceable commodities—i.e., things that 
can be translated into monetary values and thus represent pure losses to wealth. Injuries to irreplaceable 
commodities  or entitlements (Cook & Graham 1977) may affect both the magnitude of the utility function and the 
marginal utility of wealth (holding wealth constant). When the injury is to a normal good, victims do not want to 
fully insure.  Insurance demand thus looks different for losses such as death or serious permanent injury; see section 
5.C below (discussing tort coverage of pain and suffering losses). 
 
  8 When insurers can observe care and activity levels, there is no informational asymmetry, and the first-best 
solution—to require the efficient level of care and provide full insurance—is achievable by contract. 
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premiums are based on the injurers’ past claims history.  
Even when insurers cannot observe care or activity levels, insured injurers also will retain 
some incentive to invest in care (albeit weakened) to the extent they purchase insurance with a 
significant deductible.  Partial insurance is cheaper than full insurance, because partial insurance 
preserves some incentive for the insured to take care, and thus generates lower premiums per 
dollar covered. This means that, even allowing for risk aversion, injurers will likely prefer only 
partial coverage.9 Partial coverage does diminish injurers’ incentives to take care, however, so 
there is some moral hazard effect.  Shavell (1982) nicely demonstrates that the introduction of 
liability insurance in this context will nevertheless raise welfare (as opposed to a world of no-
insurance), even though the equilibrium is only second-best optimal.  The reason is that injurers 
obviously value the reduction in risk from partial coverage by more than the cost of such 
coverage (since they bought the insurance). Victims are fully insured by strict liability, 
regardless of whether the injurer has insurance or pays for losses itself, so victim welfare is 
unaffected by the introduction of insurance. And insurers are willing to sell fairly-priced 
insurance to injurers. Thus, there is no one made worse-off by the introduction of insurance, and 
injurers’ gain from bearing less risk.   
2. Negligence 
Now consider the operation of a negligence rule, and assume for the moment that neither 
courts nor injurers make any errors in assessing or applying the standard of care 10 (Column 2a of 
Table 1). In this situation it will (almost) always be cheapest for injurers to comply with the 
standard of care, since this affords them complete immunity from liability. That in turn implies 
                                                 
  9 This result might not hold if care is very unproductive and injurers are very risk-averse. 
  10 In other words, the standard is applied perfectly, both by injurers in deciding how much care to take ex 
ante, and by courts in comparing injurer conduct to the standard of care ex post. 
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that compliant injurers face no liability risk, and thus demand no insurance.  
In this context, liability insurance does not decrease incentives to take care because 
injurers will not buy insurance in order to reduce their care levels below the standard of care.  In 
this simple model, injurers face no risk of liability if they take due care, and thus insurers know 
that any injurer who seeks liability insurance plans to be negligent.  Insurers will thus rationally 
price insurance assuming that those who buy it take no care whatsoever.  The premium for such 
insurance would be very high high—higher than the cost to the injurer of taking optimal (due) 
care.11  Indeed, since complying with the standard care is cheaper for injurers than not (because 
injurers will be liable for the resulting accidents), injurers will find it cheaper to comply with the 
standard of care than to buy insurance and slack off on care. 
Knowing all this, victims will predict that they will bear the cost of any injuries they 
suffer, since these will be caused by a non-negligent injurer. Victims will thus demand (first-
party) insurance to cover the accident risks they expect to bear.12  Full insurance would lead 
victims to take no care at all, and will thus be priced disadvantageously relative to partial 
insurance. There is thus some moral hazard that takes place on the part of victims, but despite 
this, victims can be shown to gain more from risk-spreading than society loses due to moral 
hazard, so the introduction of insurance is welfare-enhancing. (Shavell 1982) Shavell’s model 
also encompasses settings where the negligence standard is not applied flawlessly, either because 
injurers misperceive the standard of care or because courts misapply it, either of which can lead 
                                                 
  11  If due care equals optimal care when we know that due care minimizes the total expected cost of taking 
care plus expected accident costs.  Given this, we know that it is cheaper to take due care and pay the expected cost 
of accidents than to take zero care and pay a premium equal to the expected costs of accidents when injurers take 
zero care.  Accordingly, injurers certainly are better off taking due care and not paying any accident costs than to 
take no care and purchase correctly priced insurance.  
12  Injurers taking the standard of care are not liable, so their victims cannot expect compensation from them 
or their insurers. Victims’ risk of being injured by a non-negligent injurer creates the demand for first-party 
insurance on the part of victims. 
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injurers to be held negligent. In this situation, compliance with the standard of care does not 
immunize an injurer from liability, so injurers will demand insurance to cover this risk. The 
insurance will optimally be designed to protect against liability for negligence due to errors or 
lapses,13 so injurers will still find it cost-effective to take the standard of care and avoid 
expensive policies that would permit them take no care. In this context, insurance improves 
welfare by risk-spreading, without creating moral hazard; it may also be welfare-enhancing 
because its presence can mitigate over-compliance that would otherwise result (in some models) 
from uncertainty over the standard of care (Calfee and Craswell, 1984). 
Injurers might also be negligent because they can’t perfectly control their own behavior. 
Such imperfections can occur because exercising due care sometimes requires ongoing attention 
by the injurer (as opposed to “durable” precautions such as fire extinguishers that need only be 
installed once), and people’s attention sometimes wanders (Grady (1988), Cooter (1991)).  
Injurers also can be negligent because they do not have sufficient information to know what 
course of conduct satisfies the due care standard (as in medical malpractice) (Arlen and 
MacCleod, 2005).  Lapses in control can also occur because of agency costs, for example when a 
firm is unable to perfectly monitor the behavior of employees who otherwise face insufficient 
incentives to invest in care (Kornhauser, 1982; Arlen and MacCleod, 2005). Under these 
circumstances, injurers will sometimes be negligent, even when they strive (optimally) not to be, 
providing further reason to conclude that there are risk-spreading benefits from liability 
insurance. 
                                                 
  13 An example might be the restriction of pollution liability coverage to “sudden or accidental” events, which 
was drafted for inclusion in standard Commercial General Liability policies in the early 1970s.  (Abraham 1988).  
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An important lacuna in the Shavell model is the assumption that all victims sue, and are 
fully compensated for their injuries. If this is not the case, and liability insurances creates some 
moral hazard, it is possible that victims might be worse off, since there will be more 
uncompensated injuries. We discuss this problem further in the next section. 
4.  Moral Hazard in Liability Insurance 
A. Contract Design 
As the preceding discussion implies, moral hazard has been perhaps the most significant 
theoretical concern animating law and economic research on liability insurance. The canonical 
model both relies on, and makes predictions about, the design of insurance contracts for liability 
risk that mitigate the potential moral hazard of liability insurance. Shavell (1982, 2004), for 
example, concludes that even when care levels cannot be observed directly, moral hazard can be 
significantly controlled through the design and implementation of insurance contracts. In large 
part, Shavell’s model either assumes or predicts that liability insurers will control moral hazard 
sufficiently so that liability insurance will be welfare enhancing.  Whether and when this 
assumption/prediction is borne out in practice is a very important and not yet adequately 
answered empirical question.   
 In theory, the list of moral hazard control devices in liability insurance is large, and many 
are not unique to liability insurance.  Empirical studies of their efficacy are much more limited, 
however, in part because data on insurance policy design and insured behavior are often 
proprietary or difficult to obtain. Institutional research on moral hazard control in insurance dates 
to Heimer (1985), though of course insurance companies have engaged in applied research for 
centuries (Baker 1996).  Table 2 lists some of the leading studies on the ability of liability 
insurance contracting to limit moral hazard, organized according to the moral hazard control 
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technique investigated.  We distinguish between ex ante moral hazard (reduction in care that 
would prevent liability), ex post moral hazard (reduction in care that would manage the extent of 
an asserted liability), and insurer moral hazard (shirking in contractual responsibilities). These 
last two categories are absent from the canonical tort/insurance model, but nevertheless play a 
significant role in defining the relationship between tort and insurance.  Insurers employ a 
variety of different mechanisms to reduce moral hazard by both the insured and the insurer.  
These can be divided into six categories. 
   1. Underwriting 
 Underwriting is the process of selecting among insurance applicants and assigning them to 
risk categories according to, inter alia, their propensity to engage in loss-prevention behavior and 
honesty in relation to claims practices.  Underwriting has the potential to reduce both ex ante and 
ex post moral hazard.  
 2. Experience-rating 
 Experience-rating and non-renewal: the process of adjusting the premium at renewal based 
on the prior claims experience and refusing to renew policyholders with the worst claims 
experience.  Experience-rating has the potential to reduce both ex ante and ex post moral hazard 
(Robinson & Zheng, 2010).  
 3. Coverage design 
 Insurers can design insurance coverage to reduce moral hazard by both the insured and the 
insurer.  First, insurers can use exclusions and sublimits to eliminate or reduce the coverage 
available for liability losses that pose a high degree of moral hazard, most commonly because of 
the more substantial control that the policyholder has over the occurrence of the loss.  These 
contract features have the potential to decrease ex ante moral hazard. They may limit ex post 
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moral hazard as well, via provisions that require insureds to cooperate with the insurer in any 
lawsuit.  Second, insurers also can reduce the insured’s moral hazard by requiring the insured to 
bear some of the cost of the accident through cost sharing and partial coverage, which can be 
accomplished through deductibles, coinsurance, and limits on coverage that are less than the total 
potential liability exposure. All of these features keep insureds’ “skin in the game,” and thus 
have the potential to reduce both ex ante and ex post moral hazard (Wang et al, 2010). While 
“aggregate deductibles” (which apply to all losses over the life of the policy) are optimal in 
theory (Arrow, 1963), they are rarely observed in practice, for reasons explained in Cohen 
(2006).  Finally, insurers can reduce insurer moral hazard through the common practice of 
bundling defense coverage (paying the defense lawyer) with indemnity coverage (paying for 
settlements and judgments) and giving the insurer control (greater or lesser depending on the 
type of policy and circumstances) over both.  Bundling has the potential to reduce insurer moral 
hazard, while giving the insurer control has the potential to reduce ex post moral hazard 
(although at the cost of creating insurer-side moral hazard).  
 4. Loss control  
 Insurers also can reduce insureds’ moral hazard by bundling loss control services with 
insurance.  These loss control services can involve mandatory conditions or simply loss 
prevention advice, which should be reliable because it is bonded by the insurer’s promise to pay 
for any claims that result (Cohen 1997-98).  Conventionally, the term “loss control” is used for 
activities that reduce loss or moral hazard ex ante, rather than manage the extent of the loss, ex 
post, but it is possible to understand defense and settlement control provisions in insurance 
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policies as ex post loss or moral hazard control arrangements.14 
 5. Ex Post auditing 
 Insurers can enhance the effectiveness of the moral hazard control measures falling into 
catagories 1-4 by employing ex post auditing techniques to enforce policyholders’ 
representations or responsibilities under their contracts.  
 6. External control measures 
 Finally, insurers can benefit from some measures, external to insurance contracts, that 
operate to reduce moral hazard. Here we distinguish among the following three types of external 
regulation: (1) Moral or professional norms: these have the potential to reduce all three forms of 
moral hazard; (2) Administrative regulation: these have the potential to reduce all three forms of 
moral hazard; (3) Legal rules promoting the enforcement of insurance contracts: these are largely 
directed at reducing insurer moral hazard. 
Table 2 about here 
The studies listed in Table 2 generally conclude that moral hazard is present, but that 
institutional devices for controlling it work reasonably well (with the caveat that differences 
among liability and insurance institutions can make it difficult to extend the findings beyond the 
specific context investigated).  The exception is Baker and Griffith (2010), who conclude, based 
                                                 
  14 From the perspective of the insurance contract, “loss control” means anything that reduces liability. But 
controls that prevent losses ex ante have very different welfare implications from those that merely avoid injurer 
liability for those losses ex post. For example, EPLI insurers often insist on sexual harassment training for 
employees as a condition of coverage.  Most such training probably has little or no effect on actual behavior—that 
is, on losses due to the occurrence of sexual harassment. (Grossman (2003 at 3) concludes that “. . . sexual 
harassment policies and procedures do not seem to have any reliably negative effect on the incidence of sexual 
harassment.”) But after the Supreme Court decided that employers were not vicariously liable for harassment by 
managers if the company had taken steps to prevent and promptly correct the problem (Farragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 1998), sexual harassment training became a kind of “bureaucratic vaccine against lawsuits for harassment,” 
Dobbin and Kelly (2007, p. 1234).  From a welfare perspective, there is a substantial difference between loss 
controls that actually reduce the incidence of harassment ex ante and those that simply shift the costs of harassment 
onto victims by forestalling injurer liability ex post. 
 
 20 
on qualitative research, that the moral hazard created by directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance may undercut the deterrence function of shareholder litigation by reducing the 
incentive of corporate boards to demand accurate financial reporting.  Even they conclude that 
this type of moral hazard could be managed, however.  If corporations disclosed the details of 
D&O insurance contract terms (including pricing), securities analysts could incorporate that 
information into a more-refined measure of corporate liability risk 
Moral hazard is difficult to measure, even with access to the necessary proprietary data, 
because of the need to distinguish between causal and selection effects (Abbring, Chiappori, 
Heckman & Pinquet 2003).  Changes in insurance contract design or other techniques that are 
understood to control or exacerbate moral hazard produce changes in claims data through 
selection effects (i.e. through the mix of people who are insured) in addition to, or perhaps rather 
than, moral hazard (Id.; see also Cohen and Siegelman (2010) and sources cited therein for 
discussion of attempts to distinguish adverse selection from moral hazard).  In recent work, 
Abbring, Chiappori and Zavadil (2008) review the prior literature and use advanced econometric 
techniques and Dutch automobile insurance data to separate these effects.  They find both ex ante 
and ex post moral hazard effects from the unique experience rating system in Dutch automobile 
insurance, which contains features that facilitate the econometric separation of these effects.  
None of the econometric studies listed in Table 2 employ techniques comparable to 
Abbring et al and thus, judged from the perspective of the state of the art in econometric 
analysis, even the findings from the other econometric studies must be regarded as provisional, at 
least in detail.  For that reason among others, the conceptual line between “generalizable” 
econometric findings and “nongeneralizable” qualitative findings is less hard and fast than 
commonly believed. Theoretically and institutionally informed qualitative research also produces 
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useful empirical insights, especially but not only when the data needed to conduct econometric 
research are proprietary. Among other benefits, qualitative research may identify questions for 
subsequent econometric analysis. For example, Baker’s (2002) qualitative research describing 
the legal rules and professional norms that limit plaintiffs’ ability to collect “blood money” from 
defendants—thereby reducing the deterrence effect, if any, of liability—prompted efforts to test 
this hypothesis using a unique public dataset of liability claims information (Zeiler et al 2007; 
Hyman et al forth.; both studies support the hypothesis). 
B. Ex Post Moral Hazard 
The standard tort/insurance model assumes that moral hazard only occurs when insured 
injurers or victims take less care to prevent losses because of the presence of insurance. 
Insurance may lead not only to reduced care ex ante, however. It may also lead to increased 
claiming ex post.  That might be a good thing from an efficiency perspective, if there would be 
too few meritorious claims in the absence of insurance (see, e.g., Andrews et al (1997) (finding 
that only 7% of all patients injured during their stay at a Chicago hospital made a claim based on 
their injury). But insurance could also generate an increase in non-meritorious claims. In the 
most extreme case, this might amount to outright fraud, on an organized scale (e.g., In Re: Silica 
Products Liability Litigation (finding systematic fraud involving 10,000 plaintiffs and 
sanctioning the lawyers who brought the suits in the amount of $825,000)), but more-ambiguous 
motivations are also possible.15   
Estimates of the amount of fraud in liability insurance are difficult to come by, for at least 
three reasons. First, detecting fraud is difficult, and conclusively proving it even more so. 
                                                 
15  For an  economic analysis frivolous litigation see Abraham Wickelgren, Law and Economics of Settlement, 
this volume 
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Relatedly, one wants to know not just the amount of detected fraud, but the total volume of 
fraud, including those cases that are not detected, which requires making difficult inferences. 
Finally, insurers, who control the data, may have an interest in overstating the amount of fraud.  
Carron & Dionne’s careful study (1997) suggests a best-guess estimate of 9.5 percent of all auto 
claims in Quebec involve fraud, although with a wide range of uncertainty. These authors also 
deploy a clever methodology that allows them to estimate undetected fraud, and which suggests 
that insurers are not especially good at catching fraud. Tennyson (2008) summarizes the 
conventional wisdom that roughly 10 percent of claims involve fraud of some kind (including 
over-stated damages), but goes on to suggest that “this statistic appears to be more folk wisdom 
than fact (at 1184) (See also Weisberg and Derrig (1991)). 
 What is missing from the literature is a rigorous attempt to integrate estimates of the 
extent and cost of fraudulent claims with the risk-spreading benefits of insurance to arrive at a 
net estimate of the welfare gains from insurance. A few authors (notably D’Arcy (1994), 
Syverud (1993-94)) have suggested that there might be a down-side to liability insurance that is 
not visible in the standard model, but without rigorously developing the ex post moral hazard 
argument. For example, Syverud suggests that liability insurance in effect creates its own 
demand, by encouraging litigation that would not be worthwhile in the absence of the deep-
pocket insurance provides. 
Table 3 provides a hypothetical example of the complex welfare calculations that might 
arise in the presence of ex ante and ex post moral hazard, given that there are victims who do not 
sue and non-victims who do. Suppose that there is initially no insurance for injurers, and that 
there are 100 actual injuries.  Twenty five lawsuits are filed, of which 24 are “legitimate” or 
valid and 1 is by a non-injured party, merely seeking to extract a settlement from some 
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defendant. Introducing liability insurance results in a relatively modest amount of (ex ante) moral 
hazard on the part of injurers.  The reduction in care leads to ten additional injuries, and eight 
additional lawsuits, of which six are valid and two are not.  Sorting out the welfare implications 
of all this is extraordinarily complicated. First, two additional victims do not receive 
compensation, while 6 additional victims who would not otherwise have sued now do so.  On 
net, therefore, the presence of insurance has beneficially raised the litigation rate and led to 
greater compensation and more deterrence, although some victims and injurers are worse off 
than before. It is thus important to distinguish between “good” and “bad” ex post moral hazard. 
The presence of insurance triples the number of “invalid” lawsuits (from 1 to 3).  If the social 
cost of these invalid suits is sufficiently high (or of course if the increase is larger than in our 
example), the welfare costs could outweigh the benefits described above.  
Table 3 about here 
C. Moral Hazard in Workers Compensation Insurance 
Historically, workers’ compensation (WC) represented the first large-scale attempt to 
substitute insurance for tort liability. WC has generated an extensive literature that is too large to 
discuss here in depth. The same problems of moral hazard that are central in other liability 
insurance relationships also appear in workers’ compensation, but greater availability of data has 
led to a larger volume of studies.  Fortin and Lanoie (2000) survey the empirical literature on 
incentive effects of workers’ compensation, and conclude that the number (and also the duration) 
of workers’ compensation claims responds positively to the generosity of benefits (with an 
elasticity of about 0.6) across a wide variety of studies (at 438). They point out, however, that the 
studies do not allow one to distinguish between “legitimate changes in injury rates following 
increases in WC coverage (the reporting effect), and changes that could reflect an abusive use of 
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the system” (at 439), leaving the question of moral hazard open. Their bottom line conclusion is 
that the long-term rise in U.S. workers’ compensation costs as a percent of payroll, accompanied 
by a steady fall in the rate of workplace fatalities (which are “presumably a good proxy for job 
safety” at 453) is “worrying,” because it suggests an increase in unjustified claiming or ex post 
moral hazard. Yet, the aggregate costs of the health care component of workers compensation 
now exceed those of the income replacement component. Moreover, there is some evidence that 
medical care providers have shifted costs to the workers compensation system through changes 
in diagnosis patterns that respond to more generous reimbursements by workers compensation 
insurance providers than managed care organizations (Butler et al 1997). Thus, the workers’ 
compensation moral hazard story is a complicated one that involves much more than worker 
claiming patterns (Baker 1996).  Confirming this conclusion, Guo & Burton (2010) find that 
“much of the substantial decline in actual benefits in the 1990s was due to changes in state 
compensability rules and administrative stringency,” rather than to worker behavior.16 
5. Additional Economic Insights on Liability and Insurance 
Insurance has been the site of much productive economic theorizing (e.g., Arrow 1963, 
Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1981).  Much of that work relates to insurance generally, not specifically 
to liability insurance or to the relationship between liability and insurance and, thus, will not be 
further addressed in this review.  The literature specifically related to liability and insurance has 
focused on the following issues. 
                                                 
16   The apparent contradiction between Fortin and Lanoie’s report of a long tern rise in workers compensation 
costs as a percentage of payroll and Guo and Burton’s report of a decline in actual benefits in the 1990s  results from 
differences in the data to which they had access.  Guo and Burton had ten more years of data, which showed that the 
long term increase in workers compensation costs reported by Fortin and Lanoie stopped in the 1990s.  
 
 25 
A. Judgment-Proof Problems 
It has long been recognized that injurers can cause harm that substantially exceeds their 
wealth or ability to pay. (Sinn, 1982; Shavell, 1986; Gilles, 2006; Harrington and Danzon, 2000) 
Absent insurance, in this circumstance, victims will be inadequately compensated by any tort 
judgment, since injurers are unable to pay for the full extent of the harms they cause. There are 
efficiency consequences as well.  Judgment-proof injurers will tend to make riskier decisions: 
Since there is effectively no liability for harms that exceed an injurers’ ability to pay, such losses 
are externalized to victims. As stressed by Sinn (1982), the existence of a minimum threshold for 
utility (e.g., via shielding of some assets in bankruptcy or through a social welfare system that 
provides a basic guarantee for all citizens) also reduces the demand for liability insurance by 
introducing non-concavities into the injurer’s utility function. (Intuitively, the judgment-proof 
insured may have higher expected utility from going uninsured than from buying insurance 
because fairly-priced insurance would have to cover and charge for losses that the insured would 
never have to pay if uninsured).  
Smith and Wright (1992) apply these ideas to the auto insurance market, in which 
liability insurance is sold as a package with uninsured motorist coverage (insurance that covers 
first party losses in circumstances in which an at-fault driver is uninsured). They suggest that 
poor and/or judgment-proof drivers will have little or no demand for liability insurance. Thus, in 
local markets where there are large numbers of such drivers, those who do wish to purchase 
insurance have to pay very high premia to cover the costs of harms imposed on them by the 
uninsured. This in turn makes insurance even less attractive to the non-judgment proof, and can 
lead to multiple equilibria, in some of which, insurance is very expensive and relatively few 
drivers are insured. Smith and Wright’s empirical evidence on insurance costs and poverty rates 
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across US cities supports this conclusion. 
Shavell (1986) discusses the menu of options for dealing with the judgment-proof 
problem, one of which is to mandate insurance purchase. Paradoxically, another option is to ban 
coverage altogether (Shavell, 2004, p. 278); this can be superior to mandating coverage if 
insurers cannot observe care levels, because injurers might be motivated to take more care than 
they would with insurance (even though they would take less care than would be socially 
optimal). Most states have some modest insurance requirements for automobile use, although 
these are frequently under-enforced and typically set at much lower levels of coverage than the 
maximum liability a driver can cause. (For details, see Baker (2008).) In the Smith and Wright 
(1992) model, mandating insurance (or enforcing existing mandates) can lower premiums and 
raise welfare. Another (complimentary) alternative is to simply regulate the conduct of the risky 
activity directly (e.g., nuclear power).  
B. The Problem of Correlated (Socio-Legal) Risk 
 Danzon & Harrington (2000) point out that liability insurance will often entail non-
independent risks. This dependence occurs because changes in legal precedents, institutions, or 
norms can influence many claims simultaneously and in the same direction. For example, a 
single Supreme Court decision about eligibility of asbestos victims for medical monitoring 
expenses (Metro North Commuter Railroad v. Buckley (1997)) would presumably control 
insurers’ liability in every one of the thousands of pending asbestos cases.  Similarly, a single 
state supreme court decision clarifying how liability insurance contracts apply to asbestos cases 
could also affect how insurers’ share liability for those cases (e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United 
Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994)).   While the lack of independence among risks does not 
make insurance impossible (Jaffe & Russell, 1997), it does make liability insurance more 
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difficult to price and, at least in theory, more expensive as result, reducing the net benefits from 
the risk distribution (Baker 2004). 
C. Tort Liability and Insurance vs. First Party Insurance 
Law and economic analysis has helped clarify the relationship between first party 
insurance (such as health insurance) and liability insurance (commonly referred to as third party 
insurance in this context).  Where some early and mid-twentieth century tort theorists saw tort 
law and liability insurance as important victim compensation mechanisms, economic theorists 
identified the very high transaction costs of tort and liability insurance as compared to first party 
insurance.  (E.g. Calebresi 1970; see Abraham and Liebman (1992) for a useful effort to estimate 
the relative roles of tort and first party insurance as compensation for injuries.)  As a result, 
economic analysis does not consider victim compensation to be the primary function of tort law 
and liability insurance. Victims are efficient beneficiaries of tort law remedies (and therefore 
receive compensation through tort law) because their injuries are a good measure of the harm 
that could have been avoided by compliance with the standard of care, and because they have 
good access to information about those injuries, and generally the best incentives to bring claims 
against injurers. Of course, what matters for deterrence is that injurers pay, not that victims are 
compensated, so payments from injurers need not necessarily go to victims in order to achieve 
deterrence.   
Calfee and Rubin (1992) review and extend the argument that, because tort law functions 
as form of mandatory victim-compensation insurance, the compensation that tort law provides 
ought to be limited to the kind of coverage victims would want from first-party insurance that 
they bought to cover their own injuries (See also Epstein, 1985).  This tends to suggest that since 
first party insurance does not ordinarily provide compensation for pain and suffering, the tort 
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system shouldn’t either. At best, this argument would apply to tort claims between contracting 
parties, such as in medical malpractice. Even in that context, however, voluntary limitations on 
tort damages are likely to reduce care.  As Arlen explains, contract-based limits on damages 
present a collective action problem in which rational individual consumers may tend to choose a 
(socially inefficient) low level of tort protection. The reason for the inefficiency is that the 
existence of the warranty provides a signal of the manufacturer’s information that the goods sold 
are of high quality. But if a consumer can simply observe the presence of an optional warranty, 
without actually buying it, he can make the inference of high quality and avoid the cost of the 
warranty. Of course, if every consumer reasons similarly, the manufacturer will have no reason 
to offer the warranty.17  
Further undermining the case for limited damages,  Wicklegren (2005) and Arlen & 
MacLeod (2003) explain, patients who undervalue the insurance provided by liability (whether 
because they underestimate the risk of liability or because the transaction costs of tort increase 
the price of insurance through liability), will bargain out of liability.  Finally, some experimental 
evidence (Avraham, 2005) suggests that people do actually demand coverage for pain and 
suffering, and Hanson and Croley (1995) point out that insureds may fail to buy first party 
                                                 
17  Steven Shavell points out (personal communication) that this argument depends on the waivability of 
warranties. There would be no collective action problem if a seller sold a good with an unwaivable warranty.  In that 
case, every consumer would know that if he bought a widget from the seller, he and all other consumers will receive 
payments if the product turns out to be defective, so the seller would have an incentive to take care in its 
manufacture.  While the Uniform Commercial Code restricts sellers ability to waive warranties (see, e.g., §§2-314 
through 2-316), it does so to “protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer” (§2-316, 
Comment 1). The Code does not appear to prohibit sellers from making unwaivable warranties.  Arlen (2010) 
suggests that in the medical malpractice context, at least, the only realistic way to achieve an unwaivable warranty 
would be through a standard form contract (because of the problem of duress in individual negotiations), which 
would present an adverse selection problem.  The products liability context also presents a risk of adverse selection, 
provided that the risk of injury is a function of both product safety and victim behavior.  Arlen points out (personal 
communication) that whether this undermines the case for contract would turn on whether consumers are better off 
under a pooling equilibrium with cross-subsidization from low risk to high risk, or under a separating equilibrium 
with low risks signaling their status by waiving liability (and getting low cost, but less safe products than they want) 
and high risks purchasing the warranty. 
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insurance for certain kinds of losses not because they don’t want such coverage, but because 
insurers will not supply it for fear of adverse selection or moral hazard.  
Like moral hazard, adverse selection (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1981) requires an 
informational asymmetry. Here, however, what is unobservable (to the insurer) is not the 
insured’s level of care, but rather the insured’s exogenously given level of riskiness. The theory 
of adverse selection predicts that when insureds know their own riskiness better than insurers do, 
the best risks will tend to select-out of the insurance pool, since they find insurance that is priced 
for the average risk to be unattractive to them. The worst risks will be delighted to buy insurance 
priced for the average person. As a result, insurers will end up selling policies priced for the 
average risk to only the worst risks, which is obviously adverse to their interests. Cohen and 
Siegelman (2011) provide an empirical/methodological survey of adverse selection in insurance 
markets. 
Interestingly, the problem of adverse selection in liability insurance has attracted much 
less scholarly attention than that of moral hazard, although both are widely understood to plague 
insurance markets in general.18  It may be that insureds do not have superior information vis-a-
vis insurers with respect to liability risk.  Alternatively, perhaps the methods for controlling 
selection are sufficient to prevent the worst risks from pooling with better ones. An influential 
article by Priest (1987) blamed an adverse selection-like mechanism for the liability insurance 
crisis in the mid-1980s, suggesting that a variety of pro-plaintiff decisions caused unraveling in 
several sub-markets for liability insurance.  Even if the law moved in the way Priest suggested, 
                                                 
18  Recent work by Arlen (2010) and Choi and Spier (2010) takes up the problem of adverse selection in 
medical malpractice and products liability contexts.  Both papers suggest that adverse selection may justify 
mandatory (non-waivable) liability; both papers conclude that allowing waivers may lead to inefficient un-pooling 
of heterogeneous customers.. 
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however, it is difficult to see how new legal rules could create asymmetric information favoring 
insureds (Ayres and Siegelman, 1989). (Absent such informational asymmetry, insurers would 
simply charge more for additional liability risks, and insureds would agree to pay more for 
coverage, with no unraveling of the market.) In sum, the scholarly literature does not seem to 
consider adverse selection to be a serious problem in liability insurance markets. 
As compared to first party insurance, tort law and liability insurance present less risk of 
adverse selection (because tort law applies to everyone, and in that sense is mandatory) and less 
risk of ex post moral hazard (because it is harder to fake a tort than an insurance claim19). In any 
event, because compensation is not the primary economic function of tort law, the debate over 
what level of tort “insurance” consumers are or should be willing to pay for is beside the point.  
Thus, for example, whether consumers do or do not purchase first party insurance for pain and 
suffering losses should not be relevant to the law and economic analysis of tort damages.20  From 
an economic perspective, the appropriate measure of damages is that which will induce 
compliance with the standard of care (Geistfeld 1995).21  
D.  The Liability Insurance Underwriting Cycle 
                                                 
  19  A tort claim is harder to fabricate than a first party insurance claim because there is – in most cases – a 
third party, in addition to the insurance company, with a significant interest in verifying the accuracy of the claim: 
the defendant.  In some cases, of course, defendants and plaintiffs may have a sufficiently close relationship that the 
defendant may be willing to “admit” to a liability that didn’t exist.   For that reason, liability insurance contracts 
often contain provisions that exclude coverage for claims brought by people with too close a relationship with the 
insured party.  Examples include the family member exclusion in personal liability insurance policies and the 
insured versus insured exclusion in directors’ and officers’ insurance policies. 
  20  It is worth noting that some first party insurance for pain and suffering damages is widely purchased: 
uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage.  While a certain level of coverage typically is mandated, many 
people voluntarily purchased much higher levels of coverage.  Moreover, because tort-based compensation poses 
less adverse selection and moral hazard (at least for victims) than first party insurance, tort based compensation can 
be more complete than voluntary first party insurance. 
21  Note that Arlen & MacLeod (2005) would modify this in situations in which injurers face a significant risk 
of accidental negligence (such as medical malpractice) because it is costly for them to obtain the information needed 
to know what action  satisfies the standard of care and where optimal investment in this information still leaves them 
with a positive probability of error.  In this case, tort damages must both induce informed injurers to want to comply 
with the standard of care but also ensure that injurers will want to invest optimally in information.  
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The liability insurance crisis of the mid 1980s prompted extensive research that 
acquainted law and economics scholars with the insurance underwriting cycle, an insurance 
industry business cycle characterized by relatively long periods of stable nominal (declining in 
real) insurance prices and periodic short periods of rapidly increasing insurance prices and 
contractions in supply (Harrington 2004). In a prominent and widely cited early contribution, 
Priest (1987) asserted that the crisis was caused by the shift to strict products liability, with 
resulting adverse selection consequences attributable to manufacturers’ private information 
regarding the safety of their products.  Schwartz (1992) subsequently concluded that product 
liability law did not change so fundamentally during the years leading up to the crisis and, as 
Harrington & Danzon (2000) report, no systematic empirical evidence has been produced to 
support Priest’s adverse selection hypothesis. The academic literature has settled on the view that 
the mid 1980s liability insurance crisis was an extreme dip in the longstanding underwriting 
cycle in property casualty insurance (e.g. Winter 1989), perhaps exacerbated by a mid 1980s 
change in taxation rules governing the reserves held by property casualty insurance companies  
(Logue 1995).    
The liability insurance crisis of the early 2000s prompted another round of research 
(Harrington et al 2008; Baker 2005).  This research supported the emerging consensus that (a) 
competition leads to excessive price cutting in liability insurance markets (perhaps because of 
weak incentives for solvency) that (b) gradually eliminates insurance capital until (c) a tipping 
point is reached (perhaps because of an external shock), at which point (d) insurers sharply raise 
prices and loss expectations, creating an extreme short-term capital shortage that allows insurers 
to earn large profits, prompting, with a delay, (e) external capital to flow into the insurance 
market (Gron 1994, Gron and Winston 2001) that, with another delay, leads back to (a) another 
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round of excessive price cutting, and so forth. (Harrington et al 2008)  (See Fitzpatrick 2004 for 
a behavioral explanation from an insurance industry insider.) So understood, the large increase in 
expected losses that accompany the crisis stage of the cycle is an effect of the crisis, not a cause 
(Baker 2005).  A very recent comparison of U.S. liability and property insurance premiums from 
1958 to 2008 shows that aggregate real premiums for both kinds of insurance have grown at 
approximately the same rate over this period as real growth in U.S. GDP (Baker 2011).  The 
pattern of growth differs, however, with liability insurance premiums exhibiting much greater 
growth during the peaks of the insurance underwriting cycle, when media coverage of liability 
insurance also peaks, suggesting that the popular perception that liability costs are growing much 
more rapidly than the economy may be the result of generalizations from a biased set of 
observations (Id.) 
E.  Liability Insurance Data as a Window on Tort Claiming and Litigation 
Empirical law and economics researchers have made widespread use of liability 
insurance data to study the operation of the tort system.  Relying on Texas Department of 
Insurance medical malpractice data, one productive research team has documented that plaintiffs 
rarely receive the amount that juries award, settlements rarely exceed liability insurance policy 
limits, and the dollar value of medical malpractice claiming has declined in real terms since the 
late 1990s (E.g. Black et al 2005; Hyman et al 2007; Zeiler et al 2007; see also Viscusi et al 2007 
for similar research using Florida data).  Carrol & Abrahamse (2005) used automobile insurance 
data from the Insurance Research Council to measure the impact of different tort law rules on the 
rate of claims arising out of soft tissue injuries, finding strong evidence of the “bad” kind of ex 
post moral hazard discussed above.  Hersch and Viscusi (2007) used the Texas Department of 
Insurance commercial liability insurance settlement database to provide useful descriptive 
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statistics about commercial litigation, which has not received the same attention in the empirical 
literature as personal injury litigation. Born and Viscusi have used the aggregate liability 
insurance data filed by insurance companies with state insurance regulators to document that 
caps on tort damages reduce aggregate insurance losses (E.g., Born et al 2009).   
Yoon has used data from individual insurance companies to measure the impact of limits 
on punitive damages and changes in rules regarding offer of judgment, finding that both sets of 
legal reforms achieve their intended results (Yoon 2001, Yoon and Baker 2006).  In addition, a 
variety of researchers have used insurance companies’ closed claim files to conduct audits on the 
performance of tort litigation, largely concluding that the tort claim process “works” in the sense 
that payments are strongly and appropriately correlated with evidence of injury and negligence 
(e.g. Studdert et al 2006).  
6. Conclusions 
The canonical model of the interaction between insurance and tort liability is too stark 
and simple to be a satisfactory description of the real world, but it nevertheless offers some 
important insights. It suggests that the interaction of insurance with the legal rules for liability 
may not cause much moral hazard after all; and even when it does, it is still likely to be welfare-
enhancing, because the risk-spreading gains are typically larger than the losses due to reduced 
investments in care or precautions. Thus, the existence of some moral hazard is not necessarily a 
system failure in a second-best world (where care is unobservable). The model also makes 
predictions about the kind of insurance contracts that we should observe: moral hazard will tend 
to be limited by pricing and contractual design, so as to discourage substantial deviation from the 
standard of care (a standard with which uninsured injurers operating under a negligence regime 
would arguably wish to comply in the absence of insurance). The standard model also directs 
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attention to the failures of ordinary tort law: when injurers can evade liability because they are 
judgment proof, or because causation can be difficult to prove, efficiency may require regulation 
of liability insurance coverage—either mandating it and banning it. The range of potential 
contract designs is vast, however.  Greater knowledge of institutional detail and much more 
empirical investigation is needed to identify and understand which designs are employed in 
which context and why.  Ideally, the results of this empirical research will be fed back into the 
modeling through an iterative process that improves our understanding of the dynamics behind 
the real world of liability and insurance. 
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Table 1: Shavell’s Analysis of The Effects of Liability Insurance* 
 
Actor 
Liability Regime 
 
Strict Liability Negligence  
 
Victim 
 
  
 
Insurance Purchase? 
(1st Party) 
 
None, already fully-insured by SL 
Yes, b/c injurer will be non-negligent, regardless of liability 
insurance, so victim will bear all losses 
Risk-Bearing? 
 
None 
 
Some, b/c of incomplete coverage 
Care Incentive? 
 
None 
 
Some, b/c of incomplete coverage 
 
Activity Incentive? 
 
None 
 
Some, b/c of incomplete coverage 
 
Injurer 
 
 (a) No Errors in Negligence 
Rule 
(b) Possible Errors in 
Negligence Rule 
Insurance Purchase? 
 
Probably partial, even when insurers are  
willing to provide full insurance 
None 
Yes, designed to cover their own 
lapses or judicial error** 
Risk Bearing? 
 
Sub-optimal, injurer retains some risk 
None: injurer will take std. of 
care, thus never liable 
None 
Care Incentive? 
Sub-optimal, injurer takes insufficient 
precaution 
Injurer will take std. of care. 
Injurers will take the standard of 
care; insurance might be helpful 
in reducing excessive care taken 
b/c of uncertain legal std. 
Activity Incentive? 
 
Sub-optimal, injurer engages in activity too 
frequently 
 
None 
Policy may require some control 
over activity 
Overall Assessment: 
Insurance improves injurer welfare by 
risk-spreading, leaves victims indifferent, 
and covers its cost to insurers via fair 
premium. Hence, it is an unambiguous 
improvement over no-insurance, although 
still not first-best. 
Insurance is irrelevant to 
injurer, because she has 
already ‘purchased’ full 
immunity from liability by 
taking std. of care. Victims 
will purchase partial 
insurance, which reduces risk, 
but dilutes incentives to take 
care, with overall net gains to 
victims and no effect on 
injurers or insurers. 
Insurance helps inj’s avoid 
liability for own lapses and/or 
judicial error; will be designed 
and priced to maintain inj’s’ 
incentives to take std of care. 
Inj’s gain from risk spreading, 
w/out incr. in moral hazard. Ins. 
may raise welfare by mitigating 
over-compliance or controlling 
activity level. Victims are 
indifferent. 
*Assumptions (based on Shavell, 1982): All parties are risk-averse. Insurer cannot observe amount of care or activity 
level. The regimes are pure strict liability or negligence, with no contributory or comparative elements. Premiums 
are actuarially-fair. Losses are purely pecuniary. Injurers can always pay for any harm they may cause.   
**Policy will not be attractively priced for an injurer wishing to be deliberately negligent. 
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Table 2: Controlling Moral Hazard in Liability Insurance 
 
Technique Effect Literature 
Underwriting:  screen in 
advance for “good character” or 
other evidence of good loss 
control 
 Reduce ex ante moral 
hazard, possibly reduce ex 
post 
Heimer (1985); Glenn 
(2000); Baker & Griffith 
(2010) 
Experience rating (& non-
renewal): Charge more for (or 
drop) those with poorer claims 
histories  
Reduce ex ante and ex post 
moral hazard 
Cohen (???); Derrig & 
Tennyson (2010); Israel 
(2004); Robinson & Zheng 
(2010) 
Coverage design:  
A.  Exclusions and sublimits that 
scale coverage to reflect  
injurers’ control  
B.  Bundling defense & 
indemnity 
C.  Cost-sharing & partial 
coverage, incl. deductibles 
 
A. Reduce ex ante moral 
hazard 
B. Reduce ex post moral 
hazard and reduce insurer 
moral hazard 
C. Reduce ex ante and ex 
post moral hazard 
 
A. Heimer (1985); Baker 
(2008) 
B. Danzon (1985); Sykes 
(1994); Baker (1998b) 
C. Heimer (1985); Baker & 
Griffith (2010); Wang et al 
(2008) 
Loss control: loss prevention 
advice/control (distinguish from 
liability prevention) 
Reduce ex ante and ex post 
moral hazard 
Skogh (1989); Simon 
(1994); G. Cohen (1997-98), 
Van der Veer (2005-06); 
Abraham (2005); Baker & 
Griffith (2010). 
Ex post auditing to enforce the 
techniques above 
Reduce ex ante and ex post 
moral hazard 
Dionne (2000); Picard 
(2000); Ericson & Doyle 
(2004); Tennyson (2008); 
Derrig & Tennyson (2008 ); 
Weisberg & Derrig (1991) 
Reliance  on other regulators  
A. Moral  or professional values 
B. Government agency 
C. Legal rules.  E.g.: 
 Duty to settle 
 Damages for bad faith 
breach 
 Waiver of coverage defense 
upon breach of duty to 
defend 
 Prejudice rule for breach of 
conditions 
 Anti-fraud laws 
D. Organizational form 
 
Reduce ex ante, ex post, 
and insurer moral hazard 
 
A. Cummins & Tennyson 
(1996); G.Cohen (1997-98); 
Tennyson (2002); Baker 
(2001) 
B.  Kneuper & Yandle 
(1994),  
C. Sykes (1994); Hawken et 
al (2001); Hoyt, Mustard & 
Powell (2006); Asmat & 
Tennyson (2010); Syverud 
(1990). 
D. Choi & Liang (2007) 
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Table 3: Hypothetical Effects of Introducing Liability Insurance on Volume & 
Composition of Litigation, When Not All Victims Sue, and Some Non-Victims also Sue 
 No 
Insurance 
Insurance Increase Description of Effect 
Number Injured 100 110 10 Ex Ante Moral Hazard 
    Total Lawsuits 25 33 8 Ex Post Moral Hazard 
    Litigation Rate 25% 30% 
"Valid" lawsuits 24 30 6 "Good" Ex Post Moral Hazard 
"Non-Valid" 
lawsuits 
1 3 2 "Bad" Ex Post Moral Hazard 
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Figure One 
Decreasing Marginal Utility of Wealth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flat Slope = Low Marginal Utility of Wealth 
Steep Slope = High Marginal Utility of Wealth
Wealth
Utility of 
Wealth U(wealth) 
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Figure Two 
Demand for Insurance 
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Appendix  
Risk Aversion and the Demand for Insurance 
The demand for insurance arises from risk aversion on the part of insureds. Risk-aversion 
is a term of art, which has nothing to do with shunning physical risks such as snow-boarding or 
rock climbing. Rather, risk aversion means only that someone has a decreasing marginal utility 
of wealth—as their wealth increases, the gain from adding another dollar to their wealth (the 
slope of the utility function) gets smaller and smaller. This concept is depicted in Figure 1. 
Risk averse individuals experience equal-sized monetary gains and losses asymmetrically 
in utility terms: not all dollars are created equal. Consider Jane, who has initial wealth W, as in 
Figure 2. If she were to experience a gain in wealth of 100%, she would move to wealth level 
W’. But notice that because of the curvature of her utility function, this 100% gain in dollar 
terms translates into a much smaller percentage gain in utility (well-being), as measured by the 
small rise in utility from U(W) to U(W’) on the vertical axis. Even though W’ is twice as large as 
W, Jane’s utility goes up by a factor of much less than this. The reason is that her wealth gets 
converted into utility at a less- and less-favorable rate as wealth increases. The converse is also 
true. A drop in wealth hurts much more in utility terms than its cost in dollars, because each 
dollar lost is worth more and more (in terms of utility) as Jane has fewer of them.   
Now suppose that Jane starts with wealth W’, and potentially faces liability for an injury 
that she might cause to someone. The injury occurs with probability one-half, and if it occurs, 
Jane will be liable for the entire amount of her wealth. Thus, she faces two possibilities: wealth 
of 0, or wealth unchanged at W’. Her average or expected wealth is just 
Average Wealth = ½×0 + ½×W’ = W, 
which lies midway between 0 and W’. But Jane’s average (or expected) utility is 
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 Average Utility = ½×U(0) + ½×U(W’),  
which is depicted in the graph as Ue, and is half-way between 0 and U(W’). Notice that 
this is considerably less than the utility she would get from having wealth W with certainty, 
which is given by U(W).  
This forms the basis for insurance. A risk-neutral insurance company22 would be willing 
to take on this risk if it could charge a premium that was equal to its average payout. The payout 
is either 0 (if the loss doesn’t occur), or 2W (if it doesn’t), each with 50% probability. In other 
words, the average payout is just W. 
Were the insurance company to charge her W to assume the risk, Jane would then have a 
guaranteed wealth of (W’ - W = W), and a guaranteed utility of U(W).23 Since this is higher than 
the expected utility from bearing the risk herself (Ue), she would be better off with insurance than 
without it. In fact, she would be willing to pay somewhat more than W to be free of the risk. 
Consider starting at wealth W’ and paying an amount (W+P) to eliminate the risk altogether: that 
leaves Jane with certain wealth (W-P), which nevertheless has a utility level that is higher than 
that associated with the gamble (Ue). Put differently, insurance is a way to move wealth from 
states of the world where it is relatively plentiful (and hence, where an extra dollar is worth little 
in utility terms) to states of the world where wealth is scarce (and where an extra dollar is very 
valuable in utility terms).Bibliography 
                                                 
  22 For these purposes, we assume that there are no costs to running the insurance company; this is obviously 
incorrect, but it makes the exposition simpler without fundamentally changing the analysis. 
  23 Jane would pay her insurer W. If the risk materialized (which happens with probability ½), Jane would 
receive 2W, leaving her with wealth of 2W - W = W. If the risk did not materialize (also with probability of ½), Jane 
would receive nothing, leaving her with wealth of 2W - W = W. So her wealth is W regardless of whether the risk 
occurs or not. 
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